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That accidents are an important incident to the use of public high-
ways is no secret; how important is often not fully realized, nor has
attention been given to the relation of such accidents to the manner
in which individuals pay for highway use.
A great deal of work has indeed gone into the measurement of
benefits from accident reduction resulting from better highway design
or various forms of accident prevention activity. But itremains
by and large true that the average user of the highways has relatively
little appreciation of the impact of his activity on accidents in general,
nor has there as yet been much discussion of appropriate means of
bringing this cost home to him. In a sense, this is but another aspect
of the externality problem involved in traffic congestion, but an aspect
which has unique features worthy of detailed examination.
The National Safety Council estimates the cost of highway accidents
in 1966 as follows:1
Property damage $ 3.3 billion
Wage loss 2.6
Medical expense 0.6
Total direct loss 6.5
Insurance administration 3.5
$10.0 billion
Not included is any allowance for "pain and suffering," whether or
not reflected in the award of damage in excess of the direct cost, nor
any public agency costs, such as those of police and courts (to the
extent not covered by legal fees), nor any indirect costs from incon-
venience to employers, etc.; nor is it clear that the claimants' expenses
of collection are included. As a general order of magnitude, however,
1NationalSafety Council, Accident Facts, 1967.I
318 The Analysis of Public Output
the minimum figure for costs is substantially in excess of total gasoline
tax revenues ($7.4 billion in 1966), and an inclusive figure would rival
the total amount of governmental expenditure on highways.2
The degree to which this cost is borne by highway users in their
capacity as such is difficult to determine with any accuracy from the
data available. One obvious mode of payment is through various forms
of insurance. Total automobile insurance premiums earned in 1967
came to $8.9 billion and loss claims incurred to $5.4 billion, which
would seem to take care of a good deal of the $6.5 billion of loss.8
However, payments by insurance companies included in many cases
a considerable amount for damages in excess of the direct monetary
cost, and in other cases must be discounted considerably to allow for
costs incurred by claimants in presenting their claims. On balance,
there remains a very substantial amount of loss uncompensated for by
such insurance. In a sampling study of Michigan personal injury acci-
dent cases related to accidents occurring in it was found that
out of an estimated total aggregate loss for the state for the year of
$178 million, only $85.2 million in reparations was received by the
victims from all sources, of which $17.5 million came from the vic-
tims' own automobile insurance, and $46.7 million from tort claims,
insured and uninsured. In addition, there was an expectation of future
compensation payments amounting to $8.4 million, not broken down
as to source, bringing the total received from all outside sources to
$93.6 million, leaving $84.5 million of the loss to be borne by the
victims individually. In a very rough average sense, then, it can be
estimated on the basis of this sample and the various outside figures
that, of the losses suffered directly by traflic accident victims, 38 to
40 per cent are compensated from automobile-related sources, i.e.,
automobile insurance or judgments against tortfeasors; 48 to 50 per
cent are borne by the victims themselves (including in this figure an
estimate of the cash surrender value of life insurance policies liquidated
to provide benefits), and 11 to 13 per cent are provided from sources
unrelated to the use of automobiles, such as sick leave provisions,
pensions, social security, health insurance, and the like. When to
this there is added the uncompensated losses experienced by bicyclists
and pedestrians, the cost of providing courts for the adjudication of
cases, and the cost of various forms of public assistance, subsidized
2Anestimate of $12 billion for 1967 is given in The Economist (London,
1968, p. xxi); it is not clear how inclusive this figure is intended to be.
Best's Fire and Casualty aggregates and averages, July 13, 1967.
4A.F. Conard et a!., Automobile Accident Costs and Payments, Ann Arbor,
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hospital care, or other services tendered to victims of motor vehicle
accidents and financed from nonmotor vehicle sources, it is apparent
that there is a gross subsidy to motor vehicle users of the order of at
least $1 billion and quite possibly as high as $2 or $3 billion, financed
in ways that have no restraining influence on motor vehicle use.
But this is on the basis of gross averages, and as so often in the
case of transportation, gross averages conceal as much as, if not more
than, they reveal. If efficient decisions are to be made as to the amount
of motor vehicle traffic to make use of, it is the marginal and not the
over-all average cost that is of concern, and the object is to bring
the decision-maker face-to-face with thedifferentials between the
marginal costs of the alternatives under consideration at the time of
decision. While there is very little good statistical information on the
relation between increments of traffic and increments of accidents,
something can be deduced from considerations of general principles.
According to the National Safety Council, some 22,300 of the
53,000 motor vehicle accident deaths, or 42 per cent, occurred in
collisions between two or more cars. It is reasonable to presume that,
in most cases where two cars collide, the accident would not have
happened if either car had not been there, and that the foregoing of
the trip by either vehicle would have eliminated the entire cost of the
accident. In effect, then, the entire cost of the accident is a part of the
marginal cost, ex post, of both trips. Bringing the marginal cost of
such accidents home to the potential motorist would involve providing
that in the event of an accident, each motorist, lacking insurance,
would be required not only to bear the cost of his own damages, but
pay a penalty equal to the damages suffered by the other. If the two
motorists wish to purchase insurance against the eventuality, they
should be required to pay premiums sufficient not only to compensate
the two motorists for the damages sustained, but in addition pay into
the public treasury a sum equal to the damage claims. That is to say,
motorists should be required to buy enough insurance to cover the
risk of accident and pay a tax of 100 per cent of the premium (or
at least 100 per cent of that portion of the premium used to pay
claims).
Matters are, of course, not quite as clear-cut and simple as this
example suggests. There is,for example, the phenomenon of the
accident looking for a place to happen, as with the maniac who per-
sists in passing on blind curves, until such time as a fatal encounter
removes his genes from the driving population by Darwinian selec-
tion. Keeping the potential victim of one fatal collision from the scene
would then merely shift the accident to another later occasion. A320 The Analysis of Public Output
similar consideration applies in somewhat modified form to the driver
of a car with a suddenly developing defect:if a tire blows out and
causes a collision with another car, keeping the other car out of the
way might only substitute a fixed object for the car, though in this
case the probable damages would be considerably reduced. On the
other hand, not all accidents recorded as noncollision, or collision
with a fixed object, are free from interaction effects: in many cases
the car that hits a fixed object (or a pedestrian!), or rolls over in the
ditch, has swerved to avoid a more serious collision with another car
that has got off Scot free.
On a larger level, one can consider, in the abstract, the relation
between increments in traffic density and increments in the number
of encounters that give rise to the possibility of a collision. On an
unseparated highway, for example, the number of times a car making
a given trip will pass cars coming in the opposite direction will obvi-
ously be proportional to the density of the opposing traffic flow, so
that the total number of such encounters will vary as the square of
the traffic density. With very low density of traffic, these encounters
will constitute the main occasions at which collisions between two
cars are possible. (Even where density is somewhat higher, so that
the accident potential involved in following or overtaking cars going
in the same direction becomes significant, such occasions also tend to
increase in frequency according to the square of the traffic flow.)
But as density increases to still higher levels, opportunities to over-
take drop off; on the one hand, this reduces the number of occasions
for accidents to take place during overtaking, and average speeds are
reduced. On the other hand, the temptation to overtake under hazard-
ous circumstances increases, and possibilities for accidents due to
multiple interaction increase, as when the slowing down of the first
car in a sequence of closely following cars forces each subsequent car
to brake somewhat more sharply than the preceding car until finally
a car finds itself unable to brake in time and collides with the car in
front. There is also the increased possibility that one collision will
involve still other cars. As traffic flow increases still further, however,
movement is likely to be slowed to the point where accidents, when
they occur, cause relatively little damage.
Unfortunately, the available statistics are not entirely appropriate
for the derivation of the marginal cost of accidents per trip. Indeed, a
superficial look at some of the data might tend to cast doubt on the en-
tire analysis. For example, data by states on deaths per vehicle-
mile show a strongly inverse relation to density of traffic: the highest
death rates are found in the Southern and mountain states, where traffic
Ir
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densities are generally low, and the lowest in the Northeast and in
California, where densities are relatively high. With respect to two
other measures, the number of bodily injury claims per 100 vehicles
and the number of property damage claims per 100 vehicles, the
reverse relation exists: the highest rates are found in the high-density
states. And if one looks separately at the death rates in one-car and
multiple-car accidents, according to some figures at least, the one-car
death rate shows a strong negative association with traffic density
while the two-car death rate shows an equally strong positive associa-
tion.5
It is clear, indeed, that there are not only a number of types of
accidents, differing in their economic implications and etiology, but
there are a number of traffic situations that present substantially dif-
ferent relationships between the volume of traffic and the cost of acci-
dents. For analytical purposes we may distinguish (a) the solo accident,
involving only the motorist himself and having substantially no exter-
nality effects, except insofar as the victim may then draw on com-
munity services or obtain nonautomobile insurance compensation;
(b) the auto-nonauto accident, in which injury is done to pedestrians,
cyclists or wayside property; and (c) the auto-auto collision. The
following types of ambients may similarly be distinguished:(i) the
low-density road, usually of at most two lanes where interactions are
almost entirely of the crossing or meeting variety, with overtaking
relatively unimportant, with the number of occasions for auto-auto
accidents varying very nearly as the square of the traffic flow; (ii) the
moderate density, nondivided highway, with some constraint imposed
on drivers by the presence of preceding cars; (iii) the high-density,
nondivided highway, characterized by extensive queuing conditions,
substantial amounts of close following, passing maneuvers executed in
the face of oncoming traffic, and the like; (iv) heavy urban traffic,
with frequent signalized intersections;(v)divided lane highways
under free flowing conditions, with interactions largely in overtaking,
or with cars stopped by emergency or entering or leaving; (vi) heavy
trafficin divided lane highways, with interactions involving chiefly
following, lane-changing, entering and leaving.
Unfortunately, the data that might show precisely how accident
rates vary with traffic volume for different conditions are not easy to
come by. One indication is given by data in Table 1 showing data for
J. L. Recht, Multiple Regressions Study of the Effects of Safety Activities on
the Traffic Accident Problem, Chicago, National Safety Council, December 1965.
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California Freeway segments6 classified by traffic density and number
of lanes: marginal accident costs seem to exceed average accident
costs by about 50 per cent over-all, though there is considerable vari-
ation in the relationship. There seems to be some tendency for the
average rate to decline with increased traffic for very low levels of
traffic, leading to a marginal accident rate below the average. This
may simply be an artifact resulting from the prevalence among the
low-volume segments of segments recently opened to traffic, where
temporary exits and entrances and the lesser familiarity of the traffic
with the road would influence the accident rate, or it may represent
a beneficial effect of a low level of traffic in keeping drivers alert,
warning of curves at night, and minimizing the chances of going in
the improper direction. In any case this range of traffic flows accounts
for only 3 per cent of the total freeway traffic. Freeways in turn
accounted for 15.6 per cent of fatal accidents and 17.3 per cent of all
accidents.
Other indications that there may be a positive relation between
traffic density on a given roadway and the accident rate per vehicle-
mile are found in the higher insurance premiums charged in high-
density areas and in data showing that limited access freeways have
lower accident rates than do older facilities.7 It is at least possible
that a good deal of this accident reduction can be related to the reduc-
tion in the traffic/capacity ratio that comes about with the construction
of extremely high-capacity facilities.
In a sense, the excess revenues generated by charges for marginal
accident propensities in excess of the average cost of all accidents
would constitute a contribution towards the rental value of the high-
ways. In this respect accidents are simply a form of congestion cost.
In a world of constant returns to scale, these excess accident premiums
would contribute to a fund which, when combined with other con-
gestion charges, would just suffice to finance the optimum roadway
system. This may perhaps be clarified by imagining that highways are
sufficiently divisible so that a number of parallel highways can be
operated serving each corridor, each highway operated by an entre-
preneur in perfect competition with the others, on the basis of a toll
which with free entry will tend to be set at a level just covering the
costs of the entrepreneur. If c is the cost of roadway per unit of width
8RichardA. Lundy, Effectof TrafficVolumes and Number of Lanes on
Freeway Accident Rates, California Division of Highways, Traffic Department,
July 1964, Table 4, p. 9.
See Table 2.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT RATES ON THE
CALIFORNIA STATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM, 1964-66






Freeways 1.00 .47 .045
Other 2.48 1.13 .091
Total 2.06 .94 .078
Urban Areas
Freeways 1.61 .68 .022
Other 5.61 1.91 .042
Total 2.84 1.06 .028
All Areas
Freeways 1.48 .63 .027
Other 3.70 1.43 .072
Total 2.52 1.01 .048
or capacity w, q the flow of traffic, and p the toll, we then have, for
each highway, pq =cw.If h =q/wis the density of traffic relative
to capacity, p =cw/q=c/h,and if we suppose that the various
roads are operated under various tolls and various densities to suit
the relative preferences of the users as to price versus quality, tolls
will vary inversely with the density of traffic; otherwise profits or
losses would induce changes in the pattern.
We may suppose that the users, in addition to the toll paid to the
firm providing the highway, also pay a premium r(h) for insurance
against accident during each use of a highway at density h, the rate
generally increasing with h to reflect the higher accident rate on high-
ways operated at higher traffic densities. (It makes no difference, for
present purposes, whether the insurance is on a liability basis or on a
direct compensation basis.) Put v1(h) for the value placed by the user
on the ith use when that use is at density h, defined as the total price
(toll plus premium) that the user would be willing to pay for use
under those conditions rather than foregoing the use entirely. Then
is the change in the value of the ith use resulting from anr—
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increment in traffic density dh produced by an increment of traffic
dq =wdhon the roadway in question. If we assume that the variety
of roadways available approximate to a continuous spectrum, then for
any use i that in equilibrium uses a roadway with a density h, a toll
p(h) and an insurance premium r(h), we must have =
(dp/dh)+ (dr/dh); otherwise the user would find it to his advantage
to move either to a less congested road where the toll would be higher
and the insurance premium lower, or to a more congested road where
the reverse would be true, depending on the sense of the inequality. In
the former case he would value the gain in quality plus the reduction
in premium more than the increase in toll, and conversely in the latter
case.
Thus, although different uses of the same roadway may have differ-
ent values, the differential between the value of each use at a par-
ticular density h, and the value of that use at adjacent densities, given
by must be the same for all uses i which use the same road
(or any other road operating at the same density h). Accordingly,
the impairment of the value of service to users of a roadway having a
volume of traffic q and a density h caused by an increment of traffic






whencep =m+ h(dr/dh) =m+ [d(rh)/dh —r].
Inother words the toll is equal to the sum of the short-run conges-
tion cost suffered by others, m, plus the excess of the short-run mar-
ginal accident cost, d(rh)/dh, over the average accident cost, r.
Of course, in practice there are generally substantial economies of
scale in rural highways at least; urban streets may be characterized
by diseconomies of scale. The extent that the roadway system as a
whole shows decreasing or increasing returns toscale would be
reflected in the generation of a surplus rent or a deficit condition.
The chief difference between accident externalities and other forms
of congestion cost lies in their pattern of variation among roads of
different characteristics and the degree of economy or diseconomy of
scale encountered. In the case of the usual notion of congestion cost,
the importance of this factor at very low levels of traffic is such that
it is usual to consider the marginal public cost of travel on such roads
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as consisting almost entirely of the wear and tear element, which has
been estimated at permile for paved roads, as contrasted with
per mile for gravel and 3.30 per mile for earth roads (to indicate
very rough orders of magnitude).8 If, however, one gives full weight
to the data indicating that high death rates, at least, are associated
F withlow traffic volumes, then it seems likely that a charge approxi-
r mating Iper mile would be appropriate9 as representing the accident
cost of travel on low-density paved roads, with perhaps a lower figure
1 for the less risky dirt and gravel roads. Since, however, only a rela-
I tively small mileage is driven, in the United States at least, on unpaved
r roads, and most of this is portions of trips involving paved roads as
well, the problem of adjusting charges to cover costs on the unpaved
roads can probably be neglected. What this means is that while, on
-
- thebasis of congestion and maintenance costs alone, traffic on low-
1 density paved roads would be considered to have a marginal cost
well below the level of the gasoline tax, consideration of the accident
element makes it possible to suppose that the marginal cost and the
a tax rate are much more closely in line in this instance. Moreover, in
C terms of accident costs, the economies of scale in low-density highway
construction appear to be much less drastic than for other costs:if
traffic is doubled and road miles are doubled to maintain the same
density of traffic per mile of road, intersections are quadrupled, and,
to the extent that intersections are an accident hazard, economies of
scale are offset.'°
Where traffic density is higher, it is difficult to say very much about
the marginal accident cost of traffic, except that itis likely to vary
considerably according to circumstances. If a general system of con-
gestion charges is installed, records enabling the cost of accidents to
be included in the congestion charge may either by that time have been
developed or may be developed as a byproduct of the congestion-
charge system. However, there are no immediate prospects for any
1 such general congestion levy, and it becomes appropriate to ask what
a
e
SSeeAllan A. Walters, The Economics of Road User Charges, International
Bank for Reconstruction and Redevelopment, Washington, D.C., 1968.
In 1966, total accident costs were $10 billion for 935 billion miles of travel,
S or per vehicle mile (National Safety Council, op. cit..p. 59). Although
accident rates are lower for lower density roads, this can be offset by the allowing
for higher death rates per accident, for the probable excess of marginal cost over
average cost, and for pain and suffering and indirect costs not included in the
$10 billion figure. On balanceseems reasonable.
t InCalifornia in 1966. 32.4 per cent of all accidents and 23.7 per cent of fatal
accidents occurred at intersections. (Department of California Highway Patrol,
Report of Fatal Injury Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents for 1966, p. 54.)328 The Analysis of Public Output
methods of paying for accidents can be suggested as more conducive
to economical allocation of resources, and to more equitable com-
pensation of victims.
The bill of indictment against the present tort liability insurance
system is a long one. Many victims obtain inadequate compensation
or none atall,as a result of the difficulty of proving fault, the
insolvency of the tortfeasor, inability to identify the guilty party, lack
of or inadequacy of insurance coverage, or improvident settlement
under pressure. A few fortunate victims obtain multiple compensation
from two or more sources. Contentious victims of minor accidents
often obtain nuisance settlements in excess of their losses, while vic-
tims having major losses appear to be substantially undercompen-
sated even where compensation is paid. The costs of the system are
exorbitant, the overheads of various kinds amounting to more than
the net amounts received by the claimants. The process of pursuing a
claim is often demoralizing, and inhibits early rehabilitation efforts.
Many insurance companies claim that the business is an unprofitable
one in general; much of the underwriting is done on the one hand
by shoestring operators who often fail to meet their obligations and
on the other by large companies or associated groups wishing to
maintain a full-line offering.'1 Unlike most other forms of insurance,
claimants are generally not the company's own policyholders, which
creates an atmosphere in which adjusters often press hard for inade-
quate settlements, especially of the larger claims. The contingent fee
system, considered unethical in many other countries, is in the United
States the dominant arrangement for the prosecution of claims, and is
considered by many to be a substantial source of abuse. Still another
feature peculiar to the United States is that the claimant is not, at
least in legal theory, ordinarily entitled to recover his legal expenses
explicitly in addition to his losses, even in cases of demonstrable
contumacy on the part of the defendant. There is thus no adequate
penalty imposed on insurance companies for going to court with a
weak case.
These and other considerations have led to repeated attempts at
reform, including the enactment of financial responsibility laws in
many states, compulsory liability insurance in a few, the "workmen's
compensation-type" plan in effect in Saskatchewan, and the "Keaton-
O'Connell" type of plan recently passed by the lower house in Massa-
chusetts but subsequently defeated. The main features of this latter.
Cf."Auto Insurance Pot Boils Over," Trial Magazine, Oct./Nov. 1967,
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plan are that losses between a given lower limit and some defined
upper limit are to be compensated on a compulsory hazard-insurance
basis without regard to fault, while victims retain the nominal right
to prosecute claims for smaller amounts on the basis of fault, on the
supposition that few will incur any very substantial expense in doing
so, and to prosecute claims on thebasis of fault for the excess over
the amount awarded on the nonfault basis.
For present purposes, however, what is important is that all of the
proposals except the Saskatchewan plan retain the current methods
of writing automobile accident insurance. While the settlement costs
might go down considerably with the elimination of fault determina-
tion as an issue in the bulk of cases, too much should not be expected
from this, since the amount of the compensation to be paid would
still require adjudication or negotiation. There would still remain in
any case the underwriting costs, which tend to be particularly heavy
in view of the complexity and inaccuracy of the rating methods
adopted by the various companies in attempting to adjust premiums
to various circumstances deemed to have a bearing on the individual
risk being underwritten. And policies would still be written basically
in terms of insuring a car for a given period, a basis that almost
inevitably seriously distorts the economics of the situation.
Three types of decisions are, in fact, involved in the generation of
automobile accidents: the decision whether to maintain a car (or a
second or third one); the decision whether to make a given trip by
car and, if to make it, by what route and at what time; and the de-
cision as to what degree of caution to exercise while driving. While
one could argue that drivers would exercise more appropriate caution
if held strictly accountable, without the possibility of insurance, for
accidents in which they were involved (even for accidents in which
they were not negligent in the legal sense), it is almost universally
agreed that it is better to accept a degree of "moral hazard" in induc-
ing a certain relaxation of caution by insuring, rather than accept the
consequencesofseriousimpoverishmentofunluckyindividuals
through lack of insurance. Many writers in the field, particularly those
advocating the abandonment of the fault concept, claim with some
degree of plausibility that, for most individuals, moral responsibility,
the threat of the uninsurable unpleasant effects of accidents, and the
threat of penalties for traffic regulation infractions provide enough
of an incentive for safe driving that the addition of the threat of
uninsured liability for damages caused would have relativelylittle
incremental effect. In some cases, the threat of increased insurance330 The Analysis of Public Output
rates for risks with bad past records may also operate as an additional
incentive, though this seems to be more of a deterrent against the
presentation of small claims than an incentive for added caution. In
any case, for present purposes this aspect of the problem can be
considered relatively unimportant. About the most that one could
consider doing in this direction would be to require all insurance
policies to have a substantial deductible to be borne by the insured
in the event of liability.12 It is one of the many anomalies of auto
accident insurance that where the insured is adjudged at fault, the
full amount of the settlement is paid by the insurance company,
whereas in collision coverage an innocent victim of an accident not
involving demonstrable fault on the part of another party is often
required to bear the burden of a deductible.
In any case the payment of the insurance premium bears primarily
on the decision whether to maintain an additional car, and only to a
minor extent,ifatall, on the decision whether or not to make a
particular trip.
To be sure, most underwriters attempt, in determining premiums,
to take some account of whatever information is available on the
mileage that the insured car is expected to cover during the term of
the policy. It is clear, however, that this provides very little deterrent
to the use of the car for marginal trips, since this usage is unlikely to
induce an increase in the premium rate, and since, in most instances,
the policyholder will be unaware of the degree to which information
on mileage driven, even if made available to the underwriter, would
affect the insurance premium. The most likely place for this kind of
influence to operate is in decisions relating to the journey to work,
where the character of the usage can be fairly well defined and taken
into account. At best, however, this influence is likely to be small,
particularly as underwriters cannot, in a competitive market, offer
large rate differentials on the basis of largely unverified representa-
tions.
Indeed, it is precisely in those cases where the maintaining of an
additional car is a close decision that the premium is most likely to
overstate the risk substantially: a car that can barely be afforded is
likely to be a car that will add much less to total mileage driven and
to risk exposure than would be indicated by the added premium that
the underwriter will find it necessary to charge. Thus, the manner of
12Ideally,one might require the size of this deductible to vary with the re.
sources of the insured.
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assessment of insurance premiums is likely to result in a more inten-
sive use of a smaller stock of active cars than would be economically
most efficient. Itis not clear whether the number of car-miles thus
generated would be greater or less than would occur under a more
accurate assessment of accident costs: this would depend on the rela-
tive elasticities at various points and either result is theoretically possi-
ble. But even if the impact of the time-related premium on the active
stock of cars were large, the cars added to the total stock as a result of
more accurate adjustment of insurance premiums would increase total
travel relatively little. It therefore seems likely that this added mileage
would be more than offset by reduced intensity of use of the existing
stock.
The inefficiency induced by the time-related pattern of insurance
premiums might not of itself be sufficient to warrant a change in the
practice, but in the light of the widespread dissatisfaction with the
present system, for other reasons, it may be an appropriate time at
least to explore possibilities for change.
A most appropriate and, as far as collection is concerned, con-
venient way of assessing the major part of the cost of accidents
against motor vehicle users might be a supplement to the gasoline tax.
Regional differencesinaccident cost rates could be reflectedin
differential tax rates, and while some inequity and inefficiency would
be engendered by the opportunity to fill up in the low-tax areas, this
problem on the whole seems minor compared to the widespread
inequitiesin the present situation or in any time-based premium
approach. It might be best to ignore state and local dividing lines and
collect part or all of the tax on the basis of the point of retail sale.
This would permit the rate to be graduated more smoothly and would
minimize the disturbances to competitive relationships that tend to
occur where the tax varies in substantial jumps across a political
boundary.
The main difficulty with this approach is that while it takes care of
collection, it fails to provide a mechanism for the distribution of com-
pensation to its victims. This is no problem in a place like Saskatche-
wan, where insurance is already a government monopoly, and it would
indeed be an easy means of achieving a substantial improvement in
equity and efficiency for Saskatchewan to replace its periodic pre-
mium system partially or totally with an increment to its fuel tax.
This would have the substantial advantage of extending coverage
almost automatically to out-of-state cars driven in Saskatchewan; the
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only problem then remaining would be to provide coverage, possibly
through conventional private coverage, for Saskatchewan cars being
driven elsewhere.
One might, indeed, consider the superiority of the gasoline tax
(and possibly also tire taxes) as a means for assessing accident costs,
not only in terms of equity and efficiency in allocation, but also in
terms of cost of collection (as compared with the cost of selling
insurance individually) to be great enough to warrant, if necessary,
the establishment of some form of monopoly organization to take
care of the awarding of benefits to claimants out of the funds thus
provided. It should not be thought, however, that workmen's corn-
pensation procedures provide an adequate precedent in themselves
for such a scheme: victims of industrial accidents constitute a rela-
tively homogeneous group to which uniform standards can be applied
fairly readily, while traffic accident victims cover the entire range of
economic status, and it may be that a more flexible, pluralistic approach
is needed to deal with the range of cases they present. The Saskatche-
wan plan has been neither a complete failure nor such an outstanding
success as to compel imitation; and what works reasonably well with
a relatively homogeneous population might develop difficulties in a
more industrialized and heterogenous area. But despite all the diffi-
culties that might develop under such a monopoly or state board, it
is hard to imagine a situation more unsatisfactory than the existing
one.
Nevertheless, the prospects for developing such a public or quasi-
public instrument are not bright, particularly as insurance interests,
in spite of their loud wails of anguish at the losses they claim to be
suffering from the existing business at regulated rates, are sure to
mount vigorous opposition to any such proposal. It may be necessary,
therefore, to seek some way by which assessment through the gasoline
tax can be combined with private enterprise claim settlement.
One way would be simply to establish a state fund derived from
suitable surcharges on fuel taxes, registration fees, drivers' license
fees, and possibly tolls and congestion charges, where these are in
effect, and then allow insurance companies to bid for the job of taking
care of accident claims relating to the operation of suitably packaged
sets of automobiles registered in the state, possibly including in each
package some suitably defined obligation with respect to accidents in
the state involving out-of-state vehicles. It would even be possible to
include in such a scheme a differential in the surcharge on drivers'
licenses to produce much the same effect as that produced by the
__________________________
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higher premium rates now generally enforced against younger drivers.
However, it seems unlikely that such a result, accepted with con-
siderable protest even when imposed by private companies impelled
by the competitive drive for better underwriting results, would per-
sist in explicit legislative enactment. In any case, there seems to be
no reliable way of varying a premium according to the amount of
driving done by a particular driver, as distinct from the mileage a
particular car is driven.
A major difficulty with such a plan, at least in the Northeastern
states, where a large volume of short-haul interstate traffic exists, is
that unless a roughly similar plan were adopted simultaneously by a
number of contiguous states, avoidance of the insurance surcharge
through preferential purchase of fuel out of state would present a
fairly serious problem, especially where state lines run through areas
with high premium rates.
One procedure that might get around this difficulty, though it would
produce others, would be to hold a mass shotgun wedding between
oil and insurance companies, by requiring each oil company, as a
consequence of the sale of its gasoline for highway use, to assume an
appropriate share of the liability for all accidents involving the auto-
mobile using its gasoline. The cost of the accidents would then be
included
in the price of the gasoline, which the oil company could
vary with location, and, in the case of credit card sale, with the rating
accorded the particular vehicle. Such a scheme would of course require
some means of determining whose gasoline a car was using at the
time of an accident. One means would be to require the maintenance
of a vehicle log, showing the gallons, mileage, outlet, and brand of
each fuel purchase, possibly backed up by a similar log maintained
by the service station, showing the vehicle license number. Where
credit cards are used the record would be relatively automatic. Another
method might be the addition of some quantitatively determinable
tracer compound to the product of each oil company, so that sub-
sequent analysis of the fuel of a car involved in an accident could
establish the company or companies liablefor the damages. To
facilitate the analysis, a removable sampling cartridge could be installed
in the fuel line at relatively slight cost. Still another method might
involve the application of a seal to the gas tank cap. Or a combination
of methods could be used.
It would even be possible to develop such a form of insurance as a
voluntary method, which would involve obligating the vehicle operator
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no essential reason why the incremental accounting and selling costs
involved should be any higher than the costs involved in the corn-
mission system; the scheme should be especially attractive to vehicle
owners running a low annual mileage. It might be difficult, however,
to develop the scheme in a form that would meet the requirements of tia
the compulsory insurance states. as
The problem ofidentifyingthe underwriting party would be ap
simpler if the liability were attached to the sale of tires, since the thi
brand here is obvious. The main difficulty with this is that tire use pe
can occur at a great distance from the place of sale, so that no sub- eld
stantial geographical discrimination is possible and adoption on less be'
than a nationwide scale would hardly be feasible. Moreover the insur- wU
ance element in the price would have to be as much as two or three be
times the present retail price, which would be likely to have serious fig
distorting effects. Unless a substantial rebate were available on the tia
turning in of used carcasses, depending on the weight of tread rubber ha
remaining, the high cost of tires might induce uneconomical and dan- col
gerous use of tires worn thin. On the other hand, the liability for vic
accidents would encourage tire manufacturers to promote safer tires. thc
There would be strong and perhaps even excessive incentives to
watch tireinflation and wheel alignment very closely, and hard
cornering and high speed travel would be appropriately costly. There
would be a slight favorable side effect in that travel on gravel and
dirt roads would be more costly in terms of tire wear, which is in
keeping with the higher maintenance costs of such roads. Use of tire
taxes as a vehicle for payments for the marginal costs of accidents
and congestion occasioned by highway users seems on the whole more
appropriate for underdeveloped countries,particularly where little
vehicular traffic across frontiers takes place, than for a federation of
fifty states jealous of their independence of action.
But whatever is done with insurance, there will remain substantial
elements of gross externality not covered by such insurance, calling
for some form of payment by highway users in addition to insurance
premiums. One element, resulting from thediseconomies-of-scale
element according to which increased density of traffic on a given
road increases the average cost of accidents per vehicle-mile, can
perhaps best be treated conceptually as a kind of rent to be charged
for the use of a limited resource, applicable, where economies of
scale in the production of roadway capacity permit, to the improve-
ment of the roadway network, but often, as in the case of core cityThe Externalities of Highway Accidents 335
s streets, considered only as a rent paid in relation to the inherent
- scarcityof urban land.
e A second externality element consisting of contributions from out-
side the motor vehicle economy for the succor of victims and allevia-
If tion of damage inflicted by vehicular traffic, can well be considered
as warranting a net additional charge on highway users to be levied
e apart from any highway trust funds and used as a general revenue. A
e third, somewhat similar element, would arise from the fact that corn-
e pensation paid victims is seldom equal to the full cost, inclusive of all
elements of pain and suffering endured by the victims. While it may
s be possible to come up with some not too outrageous estimates of
what this added cost should be evaluated at in the aggregate, it may
be impossible to come up with the comparable breakdown of this
s figure for individual cases, and undesirable to pay actual compensa-
e tion on this scale even ifit could be done, in view of the moral
r hazard that might thereby be generated. But the fact that the full
- compensationis not, and possibly should not be paid to the individual
r victim does not affect the desirability of assessing the full loss against
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The first reading of this paper, with its suggestion to let the oil com-
panies pay the costs ofall highway accidents, suggested the con-
clusion, "Vickrey scores again!" As we all know, Vickrey belongs to shi
a small, elite group who have kept the economics of public policy lef
from becoming hopelessly dull. Moreover, he belongs to a still smaller thl'
group who are nearly always right. That public authorities have always
rejected his proposals merely adds luster to his other accomplish- Tb
ments. of
However, a second reading raises questions. Although his pro-
posals this time have most of their usual attributes, it isn't clear that mc
they are right. At best, they fail to follow from his own analysis and
evidence. First, he discusses costs borne by third parties: sick leave
provisions,pensions,social security,health insurance, unallocated
court costs, public assistance, subsidized hospital care, and so on.
These classes of external costs apply to all types of accidents, and
deserve to be considered as a group, rather than piecemeal. A per-
fectlydiscriminating, Pareto-optimizing solutiontothe announce-
ment effects of these subsidies would be to discontinue them. That
may not be the right thing to do, but it highlights the point that these
subsidies deserve to be considered as a distinct subject.
Second, merely having the gasoline companies pay accident costs
doesn't meet the problem. In the light of Vickrey's own argument
about the excess of marginal cost over average cost, they should in
addition pay something, perhaps an equal amount, into the highway
fund.
Third, whereas traffic time delays undoubtedly rise monotonically
with volume, so that a net excise tax is appropriate for each trip, it is
not clear that accidents also rise monotonically. Vickrey's own reason-
ing and evidence say they do not. He notes that total fatalities decline
with volume, because a decline in single-car fatal accidents more than
offsets a rise in multiple-car fatal accidents. (Evidently the extra traffic
gets in the way and so protects the prospective single-car accident
victim.) This decline in fatalities may be enough to offset, or out-
weigh, the rise in accident property damage and bodily injury with
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higher traffic volume. Moreover, Vickrey notes that above a certain
degree of congestion serious accidents most likely stop altogether,
and accident rates, property damage, and so on, probably decline. If
so, the effect of more trips on accident rates points to a tax on trips
only up to that volume at which these rates reach a maximum. At
higher volumes there should instead be a subsidy.
in- Figure 1 shows the average traffic accident rate as a function of
volume as the curve AR. The curve MR is marginal to AR, and
to shows the additional accidents per unit of additional traffic. In the
icy left-hand portion of the figure, up to the volume V1, MR is higher
ler than AR; the difference is the appropriate rate of tax to charge so
tys that a motorist, in contemplation of a trip, bears its full marginal cost.
This difference is given by the vertical lines that shade this portion
of the figure. However, at volumes higher than V1 the line MR is
below AR; the difference is the appropriate rate of subsidy to induce























V1 Traffic volume338 The Analysis of Public Output
Unfortunately, we lack hourly data on accident rates, speed, and
volume, to measure these effects exactly. With such data it would be
possible to work out the right rates of tax for all circumstances to
correct for the combination of time delay effects and accident rates
effects.
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